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Abstract
Drawing on institutional theory, more specifically DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983)
notion of institutional isomorphism, and Oliver’s (1991) typology of strategic
responses to institutional pressures, this paper develops an analytical framework to
examine the factors that influence organisations to change their performance
measurement systems, and the responses to consequential change efforts within the
context of the banking industry. The paper suggests that various macro-level
environmental factors which affect the functioning of banks (e.g. economic
conditions, technological innovations, socio-cultural and political factors) exert
pressure (coercive, mimetic and normative) to change their performance measurement
practices. The paper proposes that rather than passively conforming to such pressure,
banks respond strategically, with the strategic responses taking various forms
including non-compliance. The proposed framework could be used by managers and
researchers to examine and understand changes in performance measurement systems
in banks and to facilitate the effective adoption and implementation of performance
measurement systems.
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1.

INTRODUCTION

The banking industry has experienced major changes in recent times due to the
impact of deregulation, advances in information systems and technologies,
globalization, and more recently the global financial crisis triggered by the subprime
turmoil in the United States (Kahveci & Sayilgan 2006; Lapavitsas & Santos 2008;
Wignall & Atkinson 2010; World Bank 2005). Businesses that were regarded in the
past as profitable and safe have come to be seen as uneconomical and reckless (Erturk
& Solari 2007; PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2009). The speed and intensity with which
the banking industry has changed, has led to phenomenal growth in international
transactions, expansion of banking operations across borders, and the restructuring
and consolidation of banks. Such growth in turn has prompted banks to seek new
sources of income, use complex tools for risk assessment and mitigation, and have
greater awareness of their costs and the productivity gains to be realised from work
reorganisation and financial innovations (Bank for International Settlements 2006;
Helliar, Cobb & Innes 2002; PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2009). Accordingly, in
addition to the traditional banking products, banks have become more involved in
volatile investment activities and financial instruments such as junk bonds, leveraged
buyouts, commercial papers, mutual funds, derivatives and assets securitisation
(Citigroup Annual Report 2000; Frei, Harker & Hunter 1998; World Bank 2008).
Banks have increasingly become subject to immense pressure from their
stakeholders to improve performance, forcing them to re-examine their traditional
management control approaches and technologies, strengthen their capital base,
reduce their non-performing and toxic assets, bring down operational costs, enhance
corporate governance and sharpen their customer centric initiatives (Frei et al. 1998;
Helliar et al. 2002; Lapavitsas & Santos 2008). Moreover, the recent financial crisis
which started in mid-2007 has forced banking institutions worldwide to grapple with
reduced public confidence, heightened shareholder scrutiny and increased regulatory
insight (Wignall & Atkinson 2010). Additionally, the introduction of risk-adjusted
performance measurement guidelines by the Bank for International Settlements, the
Basel Accords2 and stringent supervisory control frameworks such as CAMELS3 and
CAEL4, have resulted in the significant transformation of banks in respect to
organisational structures, systems and strategies (Geyfman 2005; World Bank 2005).
In an attempt to support such changes, many banks have adopted
technologically sound and sophisticated management practices (Bank of England
2003). The adoption of new technologies and management practices have led to
concerns in regards to the suitability of their existing control systems, including
2

Basel Accord I was released in 1988 which was later replaced with Basel Accord II in 2004. The
Basel Accord II rested on three pillars: minimum capital requirements (pillar 1), guidelines on
regulatory intervention to national supervisors (pillar 2) and new information disclosure standards for
banks (pillar 3). In a response to the global financial crisis the Basel Committee has drafted Basel
Accord III to replace Basel Accord II from 2012.
3
The CAMELS framework involves analysis of specific groups of performance measures namely
Capital adequacy, Assets quality, Management, Earning quality, Liquidity and Sensitivity (market
risk).
4
The CAEL framework involves analysis of four groups of performance measures namely Capital
adequacy, Assets quality, Earnings and Liquidity.

94

Munir , Perera & Baird: An Analytical Framework to Examine Changes

performance measurement systems (PMSs)5. In particular, there is an increasing need
to introduce changes to PMSs in order to develop and adopt innovative and robust
solutions for management controls, new databases and new analytical ways to
prudently assess costs, benefits and risks (Guerreiro, Alberto & Frezatti 2006;
Hawkins & Mihaljek 2001; Karr 1997; PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2009). Banks are
also being encouraged to adopt management accounting tools, such as activity-based
management, customer profitability analysis, target costing, benchmarking, value
based management and integrated PMSs6 (Frei et al. 1998; Helliar et al. 2002;
Khiaonarong & Liebena 2009; Kimball 1997).
It has become evident that in order to meet the challenges of the changing
organisational environment, management control systems, within which PMS is a
part, should be adjusted before they lose their relevance (Eccles 1991; Ferreira &
Otley 2009; Ittner & Larcker 1998; Kaplan 1984; Modell 2007). A primary difference
between banks that succeed and those that fail is the ability to respond to the pace of
change7 to scan and monitor their external environment, and to anticipate and adapt
timely to continual change (Tanner 2009). Alternatively, the inability of banks to
recognize the need for change and their fragile adaptation ability could contribute to a
decline
in
their
performance
(Demirguc-Kunt
&
Huizinga
2000;
PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2009). Hence, it is important that PMSs adapt to the recent
environmental conditions as reflected in the following comments by Dixon, Nanni &
Vollmann:
A good measurement system needs to be continually changed in order to
remain effective. As one set of goals or objectives is satisfied, or as the set
of measures becomes too gross to detect improvement, a new set need to
be articulated, and the old set needs to be discarded or modified. This
means there can never be a set of good performance measurement that is
stable over time. (1990, p4-5):
However, it seems that the link betwen the changes in the organisational
environment and changes in PMSs is not a simple linear process. Specifically,
organisations often prefer to maintain the status quo and are reluctant to implement
required changes without a certain degree of coercion. Furthermore, even after a
5

In the management accounting literature there are various interpretations and explanations of the
concept of PMS. Kaplan (1984), for instance, described a PMS as an information system that aims to
provide financial signals in order to help management make decisions. In a similar vein, Marshall et al.
(1999) describe a PMS as a development of indicators and collection of data to describe, report and
analyse performance. Neely, Gregory and Platts (1995) considered a PMS as a process of quantifying
both the efficiency and effectiveness of actions. Recently, in a more comprehensive perspective,
Simons (2000) defined a PMS as formal information based routines and procedures that managers use
to maintain or alter patterns in organisational activities.
6
Examples of these systems are the Performance Measurement Matrix (Keegan, Eiler & Jones 1989),
SMART Pyramid (Lynch & Cross 1991), Result and Determinants Framework (Fitzgerald et al. 1991),
Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan & Norton 1992), Performance Prism (Neely, Adams & Kennerley 2002)
and Comparative Business Scorecard (Kanji & Moura 2002).
7
The research on organisational change regards change as a continuous, unpredictable process driven
by environmental instability that organisations try to overcome through different modifications and
adaptations (Burns & Vaivio 2001).
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decision is made to introduce change, rather than passively accepting the change,
organisational members may respond to such decisions in different ways.
Accordingly, an awareness of the factors influencing changes in PMSs, the forms of
pressure that enact change, and the way in which organisations respond to change
efforts is required to fully understand changes in PMSs within banks.
While existing studies on changes in PMSs in banks address various issues
in relation to changes, such as the process of change, its nature and outcome, they do
not explicitly present a framework to analyse the factors that influence such change or
consequential responses to such change attempts. A number of studies have
developed analytical frameworks to examine similar issues (e.g. Kasurinen 2002;
Burns & Scapens 2000; Waggoner, Neely & Kennerley 1999; Greenwood & Hinings
1996; Innes & Mitchell 1990) in manufacturing organisations, but their applicability
to banks is limited due to management and operational specificities that are different
from manufacturing organisations. Additionally, these frameworks suffer from a
number of shortcomings. For instance, Burns & Scapens (2000), Greenwood &
Hinings (1996) and Kasurinen (2002) state that many of the frameworks used to
examine management accounting change do not help to explain complexities of the
change process, and have failed to provide a holistic analysis of the macro-level
context of an organisation as well as its institutional context. Further, managerial
responses to the institutional pressures influencing change have generally not been
addressed in these frameworks. Accordingly, the main motivation of this paper is to
develop an analytical framework to examine changes in PMSs with a specific focus
on the factors influencing the change and the responses to change efforts within the
context of the banking industry. The paper draws on institutional theory, more
specifically DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) notion of institutional isomorphism, and
Oliver’s (1991) typology of strategic responses to institutional pressures.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an
outline of the theoretical underpinning of the framework developed in this paper.
Section 3 then discusses the environmental factors that affect the functioning of
banks. The institutional pressures that could influence changes in PMSs are discussed
in Section 4, followed by a discussion of the strategic responses to institutional
pressures in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 provides a summary of the paper and some
concluding remarks.
2.

THEORETICAL UNDERPINNING

Institutional theory has evolved into a body of literature encompassing multiple levels
of analysis concerning change in organisations. It deals with how organisations are
affected by forces which lie beyond its control (Hoffman 1999) and is built on the
notion that institutional environments are socially constructed (DiMaggio & Powell
1983). Accordingly, the institutional environment and its participants play key roles
in shaping organisational systems, structures and behaviours. Scott (1998, p12)
explains that:
every organisation exists in a specific physical, technological, cultural
and social environment to which it must adapt. No organisation is self-
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sufficient, all depend for survival on types of relations they establish with
larger systems of which they are a part.
From this perspective, an organisation must comply with environmental
changes if it is to receive legitimacy and continued societal support. Thus, the
institutional environment is viewed as defining not only the appropriate
organisational systems, structures and behaviours but also the manner in which they
conform to institutionalised beliefs in society. While institutions are an integral part
of organisational life, institutional theory treats institutions as largely exogenous to
the organisation. Institutional theorists suggest that institutional theory can be applied
to a variety of different organisations and many different levels of analysis, stretching
from a macro-system perspective to an organisational sub-system perspective (Scott
2001). These levels are connected within an organisational field. DiMaggio & Powell
(1983) introduced the concept of organisational fields to analyse the context of an
organisation which includes closely related suppliers, customers, regulators,
competitors or other important inter-organisational links which are important
determinants of institutional pressures. DiMaggio & Powell (1983) further emphasise
that the impact of institutional pressure is dependent on the position of a particular
organisation within an organisational field. Over time, organisational fields are
subject to change (Greenwood & Hinings 1996).
The mechanisms through which organisations adopt systems and procedures
is termed institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). Isomorphism is “a
constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that
face the same set of environmental conditions” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983, p149).
They identify three mechanisms through which institutional isomorphism occurs,
each with its own antecedents - coercive, mimetic and normative. “Coercive
isomorphism” is the response to:
both formal and informal pressures exerted on organisations by other
organisations upon which they are dependent and by cultural
expectations in the society within which organisation functions
(DiMaggio & Powell 1983, p150).
Organisations are forced to change their systems and procedures directly as a
consequence of changing legislation. This adherence to pressure helps the
organisation to secure economic resources and legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan 1991).
“Mimetic isomorphism” is the act of copying other organisations when organisations
face uncertainty, and the way in which they “model themselves on other
organisations” in order to overcome uncertainty (DiMaggio & Powell 1983, p151). In
particular, ambiguous organisational goals and strategies or poorly understood
technologies may cause organisations to model themselves on other organisations.
Scapens (1994) argues that mimetic behaviour has a conformity element, wherein
organisations adopt contemporary practices to legitimise their structures, systems and
processes by appearing to be in control. “Normative isomorphism” is associated with
professionalisation (DiMaggio & Powell 1983, p152), and arises when professionals
operating in organisations are subject to pressures to conform to a set of norms,
values and rules developed by occupational and professional bodies (Abernethy &
Chua 1996). In this form of isomorphism, organisations feel obliged to adopt
structures, systems and processes that have been advocated by dominant occupational
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and professional groups (Burns 2000). Informed by DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983)
notion of institutional isomorphism, this paper argues that banks may introduce
change to their PMSs as a result of these three forms of pressure.
Figure 1
Analytical Framework for examining changes in performance measurement systems within the
banking sector
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However, DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) notion of institutional isomorphism
does not address the possible organisational responses to change efforts (Oliver 1991)
and the strategic behaviours associated with the consequential change (Covaleski &
Dirsmith 1988). There have been calls advocating the extension of DiMaggio &
Powell’s (1983) notion of institutional isomorphism to include responses to the
institutional pressures to analyse change (Greenwood & Hinings 1996). Oliver (1991)
discusses the various strategies organisations appear to adopt in response to
institutional pressures to change. While questioning the notion of institutional
determinism, she argues that organisations respond to different environments by
pushing them in differing directions due to diverse norms and expectations.
Accordingly, conforming to institutional pressures is not an exclusive option, even if
it might be tempting in order to gain legitimacy. The possibility of achieving gains
through resistance is also argued to exist. Thus, it is argued that an organisation
makes an active response to institutional pressures with the extreme option being to
either conform or resist. Oliver (1991) presented a continuum of strategic responses
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with five types of responses (acquiescence, compromise, avoid, defy, and
manipulate)8.
Hence, the framework developed in this paper to examine changes in PMSs in
banks draws from both DiMaggio & Powell (1983) and Oliver (1991). The proposed
framework is depicted in Figure 1. The framework identifies a number of macro-level
factors that affect the functioning of banks and the resulting institutional pressures
which could lead to changes in their PMSs. The paper also recognises the influence of
strategic responses when introducing change with the direction, nature and outcome
of change efforts likely to be determined by the responses of the key organisational
actors. Environmental factors that could have an impact on PMSs, and the
institutional pressures that could lead to changes in PMS are discussed respectively in
Sections 3 and 4, with the strategic responses of organisations to such changes
discussed in Section 5.
3.

ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS THAT AFFECT THE FUNCTIONING OF BANKS

The literature suggests that changes in PMSs are influenced mainly by the macrolevel environment of banks (Hussain & Hoque 2002) with the resulting changes
improving not only the quality of information, thereby leading to increased
productivity and accountability (Perera 2004), but also the ability to survive in a
highly competitive environment (Cobb, Helliar & Innes 1995; Helliar et al. 2002).
Hussain & Hoque (2002) suggest that changes in the macro-level environment could
influence changes in the strategy and/or structure of banks, which in turn could lead
to changes in management control systems, including performance measurement
practices. The macro-level environment is an outer realm of banks which is outside
their control. Innovations in management philosophies, trade liberalisation, new
technologies, increased competition, changes in regulatory frameworks, and uncertain
economic and political conditions have often been cited in the banking literature as
major factors that influence the functioning of banks (Helliar et al. 2002). This study
combines these macro-level factors into three categories, namely economic
conditions, technological innovations, and socio-cultural and political environment.
Economic Conditions
In recent years banks have faced an uncertain economic climate because of
macroeconomic factors such as globalisation, liberalised deregulation, privatisation,
and highly fluctuating, at times unpredictable, inflation and interest rates (Harker &
Zenios 1998; Helliar et al. 2002; World Bank 2009). Such economic conditions place
pressure on banks to improve performance (Burney 1999; Williams & Seaman 2002),
and one area that could be used for that purpose is the PMS. Performance could be
improved by using existing measurement and control systems more efficiently or by
introducing new systems for that purpose (Brignall & Modell 2000; Hussain & Hoque
2002). For instance, the recent global financial crisis which started in 2007 has forced
many banks to strengthen their PMS and internal management controls by integrating
strategic planning, risk measurement and mitigation frameworks, and performance
8

Explanation of these responses is provided in Section 5.
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reporting systems in order to enable each business area to monitor its contribution,
and deliver clearer, relevant and more consistent financial information (Bank of
England 2008, p27-30). Anecdotal evidence suggests that volatile market conditions
(e.g. fluctuations in interest rates, foreign exchange rates and equity prices) generate
high risk for banks and threaten their earnings, capital, liquidity, and solvency.
Effective risk management within banks demands accurate and timely risk
quantification which can be assisted by an efficient PMS9 (Bank of England 2008).
Therefore, banks need more formal, detailed PMSs that not only establish stringent
internal controls but facilitate prudent analysis that captures all activities which
expose banks to risk and then measures the specific risks presented.
Banking was traditionally a highly protected industry with restrictions on
domestic and foreign entry. However, progressively liberalised deregulation, both
within countries and across national boundaries, has led to cut-throat competition
between banks and other financial institutions (Hawkins & Mihaljek 2001). For
example, GE Capital, the financial services subsidiary of General Electric and Tesco,
offers financial services including credit cards, loans and insurance. As in other
industries, the degree of competition in the banking sector is primarily driven by the
need to create efficiency in financial services, the quality of financial products and the
degree of innovation in the sector (Frei et al. 1998; Oberman 2006). In the face of
these objectives banks are attempting to redefine their businesses. The traditional
financial intermediation role of banks to provide loans and mobilise deposits has
become a relatively less important part of the overall business, as banks are
diversifying into a wider range of services (Lapavitsas & Santos 2008). Further,
Claessens & Laeven (2003) and Hawkins & Mihaljek (2001) note that one of the
catalysts for increased competition is the removal of ceilings on deposits rates. This
deregulation measure has reduced sources of cheap funding for many banks and put
pressure on their profits, thereby forcing them to price risks more realistically and to
charge explicitly for previously free services (Berger 2003; Hawkins & Mihaljek
2001). The increased competition in the banking sector has not only facilitated the
access of organisations and individuals to financial services and financing, but also
eroded the market share of many banks. Consequently a substantial number of banks
are entering into high risk ventures making it vital for banks to apply integrated PMSs
and apply appropriate internal controls for different activities (Bank for International
Settlements 2009).
The easing of restrictions on entry of foreign banks and the search for global
markets for profit opportunities have led to a growing presence of foreign-owned
banks in domestic markets in many countries (Gormley 2007; World Bank 2005,
2006). As a result, banks now increasingly look for sophisticated management tools
to exploit new businesses. Foreign banks have introduced a range of procedures,
technologies and experience that focus on credit, automated credit scoring, mass
distribution channels and electronic lending platforms, such as credit card networks
(World Bank 2006). They have been able to successfully compete against socially
and culturally embedded domestic banks, partly due to their usage of superior
technology and customer service (Lapavitsas & Santos 2008; Hitt & Frei 2002).
9

See for details: Operational Risk Management, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1998) and
Risk Management in the New Regulatory Environment, Gartner Inc., (2003).
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Notable examples of such banks include Citibank, Hong Kong Shanghai Banking
Corporation and Standard Chartered Bank. These conditions in the economic
environment suggest that the success, or even long term survival of a bank would
depend upon the appropriate utilisation of resources as well as their control over the
costs and quality of services.
The need for more comprehensive PMSs to assist organisations to operate
effectively in today’s competitive environment has often been emphasised by
accounting academics and practitioners (Ferreira & Otley 2009; Chenhall & Euska
2007; Sulaiman & Mitchell 2005). A number of recent studies have also concluded
that traditional PMSs are inappropriate given today’s complex economic conditions,
with such factors considered to be an influential factor in regard to the changes in
PMSs in banks.
Technological Innovations
The impact of technology on management accounting practices including
performance measurement practices has been well recognized in the management
accounting literature (e.g. Johnson & Kaplan 1987; Otley 1994). The literature
suggests that the innovations in technology has contributed significantly to the
expansion of the banking industry (Kimball 1997), with Kaplan & Norton (1996)
arguing that the impact of information technology is even more revolutionary for
service than manufacturing organisations.
Technological innovations play a pivotal role in the performance of banks.
Technology provides an opportunity for banks to improve service performance in
addition to providing a broader range of financial products and services. The
literature on banking reveals that over the last two decades there has been a
phenomenal increase in the offer of e-banking or e-finance products and services by
banks, such as internet banking, debit cards, e-bill payments, smart cards and storedvalue cards, in order to stay competitive (Allen, McAndrews & Strahan 2002). These
advancements have allowed banks to innovate customer service and delivery
channels, not only to fulfil the needs of customers, but also to achieve economies of
scale and to increase competitiveness (Hitt & Frei 2002). Consequently, banks have
increasingly started focusing on customer and product profitability analysis as key
performance measures thereby requiring them to create existing and potential
customers’ profiles which become important to the decisions to lend, mobilise
deposits and track movement of customers’ accounts (Helliar et al. 2002;
PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2009).
Additionally, transactions between banks and their depositors have mostly
become automated, the role of bank branches has been significantly changed, the
techniques of funds transmission have been altered, and new ways of managing
accounts and making payments have emerged. Banking literature suggests that
automation of transactions and the associated developments have radically changed
the operational structure of banks and have contributed to steadily rising Automated
Teller Machine (ATM) numbers, online transactions, and increased pressure on banks
to expand investments in complex information technology infrastructures (Berger
2003). While these changes have created new fields of profitability for banks, the
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changes have also significantly enhanced risks for banks due to the enhanced volume
of business activities and increased flow of information (Bank for International
Settlements 2006). Against these trend, anecdotal evidence suggests, that many banks
have been forced to adopt new types of performance measures, such as number of
customers per ATM, number of transactions per ATM, number of faulty transactions,
and number of ATM breakdowns, in order to foster control over business activities.
Socio-cultural and Political Environment
The socio-cultural and political environment is generally characterised by the rules
and requirements to which individual organisations must conform if they are to gain
support and legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). Scott (2001) suggests that
political pressures generally result from changes in the interests of individuals or
groups, and underlying power distributions that provide support for the existing
institutional environment. Socio-cultural pressure is associated with differentiation of
groups and the existence of heterogeneous or divergent beliefs and practices. The
presence of these pressures undermines the stability of organisation, hence resulting
in the gradual abandonment of a set of management practices within an organisation
(Stark 1996). For example, in many Islamic countries, banks have been forced to
introduce “profit and loss based or interest free” banking products, abandoning the
“interest based” products to satisfy the fundamental belief (faith) of Islamic societies
which prohibit charging interest (Ahmad 1993). Consequently, central banks in many
Islamic countries have issued a separate set of prudential regulations for Islamic
banking activities.
Alam (1997), Hoque & Hopper (1994), and Hussain & Gunasekaran (2002),
among others, have identified a number of social and political factors which have
forced changes in organisational structure and strategy such as political instability,
resource scarcity and coalition amongst organisations. Within the banking literature it
is argued that banks voluntarily, or some times obligatorily, follow international
organisational standards/quality measurement stipulations determined by institutions,
such as the Bank for International Settlements, International Standards Organisation
(ISO) and the United Nations Organisation (UNO), and consequently adapt their
performance measures to conform to the recommendation of such bodies (Holland,
Lockett & Blackman 1997). For instance, the Bank for International Settlements has
made it obligatory for the banks operating in developing countries to adopt
performance measures and internal control standards set under Basel Accords if they
intend to operate in international markets. Banks in these countries have also been
encouraged by the Bank for International Settlements to extensively use their PMS in
order to restrain the negative impact of political and social instability. Similarly,
transnational institutions like the World Trade Organisation (WTO), World Health
Organisation (WHO) and regional blocs also encourage banks to adopt practices that
are consistent with international standards and practices. In considering the above
factors, socio-cultural and political environments have a tendency of influencing
performance measurement practices within banks.
The three categories of macro-level factors discussed in this section, namely
economic conditions, technological innovations, and socio-cultural and political
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environments are considered to have a significant influence on banks’ functioning. As
a result, banks generally become more competitive, resilient to technological
innovations and associated service capabilities, and responsive to socio-cultural and
political needs in order to secure their survival and legitimacy. Such requirements
have significant implications for PMSs within banks. Nevertheless, organisational
responses to macro-level influences are often not spontaneous. The direction and the
nature of responses to the influence of the macro-level factors could result from three
types of pressures (coercive, mimetic and normative) which are discussed in the
following section.
4.

INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURES FOR CHANGE

Institutional theory suggests institutional pressures make organisations adapt in order
to gain legitimacy (Covaleski & Dirsmith 1988). Pressures on banks to introduce
change could occur in three forms namely coercive, mimetic and normative. This
section discusses the way in which these pressures cause banks to respond to the
macro-level factors discussed in the previous section.
Coercive Pressure
Institutional theory suggests that some institutional fields contain powerful
environmental agents who impose structural forms or practices on subordinate
organisational units (DiMaggio & Powell 1983, 1991). Coercive pressures to change
performance measurement practices could eventuate from other organisations upon
which a particular organisation is dependent (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). For
instance, in relation to the banking sector, prior research highlights the coercive
influence exerted on organisations or on their behaviour through the central bank’s
regulatory control and financial regulations (Hoque & Hopper 1994, 1997; Hussain
2003).
Central Bank’s Regulatory Control
Banks are required to function within the regulations and guidelines of central banks,
such as prudential regulations and Basel Agreements. The Basel Accord II describes a
more comprehensive measure and a minimum standard for capital adequacy that
supervisory authorities are required to implement through rule-making and adoption
procedures. It seeks to improve the existing rules by aligning regulatory capital
requirements more closely to the underlying risks that banks face. In addition, the
Basel Accord II was intended to promote a more forward-looking approach to capital
supervision, one that encourages banks to identify the risks they may face today and
in the future, and to develop or improve their ability to manage those risks. In order to
comply with Basel Accord II many central banks introduced the CAMELS and CAEL
frameworks to evaluate banks’ performance (Asian Development Bank 2002; Hilbers,
Krueger & Moretti 2000; Lall 2009). The failure to comply with the central bank’s
regulations and guidelines attracts financial penalties or cancellation of a banking
license. Banks are, therefore, required to improve their performance measurement as
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well as internal control and risk measurement practices to be in accordance with the
central banks’ and Basel standards. The pressure to improve performance
measurement will be far greater in the next few years after the implementation of
Basel Accord III at the end of 2012. According to the new regulations under Basel
Accord III banks will be required to: maintain higher tier-1 and tier-2 risk-weighted
capital ratio; use a leverage ratio as a safety net: maintain higher liquidity: use higher
risk-weightings for trading assets of the banks; and exclude most of the off-balance
sheet exposures from capital (Lall 2009; Wignall & Atkinson 2010).
Financial Legislation
Accounting bodies such as the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) in the
US and the international Accounting Standard Board (IASB) in the UK prescribe
accounting standards, which in turn impact on the accounting systems upon which
PMSs rely. Central banks require banks to follow the accounting standards and
International Statements of Auditing (ISAs) and Audit Codes issued by the
International Federation of Accountants (IFACs). The Basel Accord II requires that
banks implement a progressive adoption of risk evaluation techniques. This has
forced banks to transform their existing systems and procedures to accommodate the
financial information requirements stipulated in the Basel Accord. Most of these
changes have resulted in improvements in the disclosure of financial information
arising from the reformulation of accounting rules for entries and reporting. These
reformulations were designed to improve the informational quality of statements so
that they accurately represented the true performance of the bank. The Sarbanes
Oxley Act (2002) introduced in response to a series of corporate scandals in the US,
requires organisations, in particular banks, to identify, assess and test the
effectiveness of their key management controls and monitoring within the business to
ensure greater accountability, transparency, and compliance with laws and regulations
(Merchant & Van der Stede 2007).
Mimetic Pressures
DiMaggio & Powell (1983) argue that in an uncertain environment, organisations will
imitate others in determining appropriate behaviour. Patterning their own operational
or decision making systems on the systems used by industry leaders is seen as a
means of reducing uncertainty and risk, and enhancing legitimacy (DiMaggio &
Powell 1983; Greve 2000). Banks that lack the ability to implement and utilise their
own PMSs tend to copy publicly accredited best practice PMSs from other successful
banks, or from manufacturing organisations (Fligstein 1985; O’Neill, Pouder &
Buchholtz 1998). This tendency of modeling practices of successful organisations
occurs from a desire to gain legitimacy from their operating environment, although
the relationship of PMSs with strategy and performance can still be absent. Large and
high performing banks serve as strong role models for other banking institutions
(McKendrick 1995). Anecdotal evidence suggests that mimetic behaviour occurs
through a number of formal and informal avenues. For example, by recruiting
professional and well trained employees of other banks and using them to develop
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similar systems they had used in the past. Hence when macro-level factors require
banks to change their PMSs, in order to gain legitimacy and to signal to stakeholders
their intention to improve efficiency, in certain situations banks would copy best
practices in the industry.
Normative Pressures
According to DiMaggio & Powell (1991) normative pressure stems primarily from
pressures from professionals. Professionalism refers to the collective struggle of
members of an occupation, shared educational and professional experience, and
infrastructure that establish norms of behaviour reflected in the management who
make up institutions (DiMaggio & Powell 1991). In the banking sector, credit rating
agencies, bankers’ professional associations, and banks’ training institutions reinforce
normative expectations and impose standards, rules and values on banks. Normative
pressures can be exerted by professionals, top management and the organisational
culture prevailing in a bank.
Professionals
DiMaggio & Powell (1983) identify professionals as having the most dominant
influence on organisational practices. Professional networks such as associations of
accountants are known as an important source of isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell
1991; Scapens 1994). In studying management control practices, Scapens (1994)
regarded the influence of managers as an important factor in the adoption of new
management practices. Hussain & Hoque (2002, p167) also acknowledge that “the
experience of professionals such as managers may also influence the design and use
of a performance measurement system”. Thus, professionals in a banking context,
including bankers associations and bankers’ training institutions such as the Institute
of International Bankers and the World Bank’s Economic Development Institute,
could have an influence on the PMSs that are used within banks.
Top management
Granlund & Lukka (1998) and Scott (1987) argue that top management often creates
cultural forms consistent with their own aims and beliefs. These, in turn, influence
organisational practices and systems, including PMSs. The existing literature suggests
that board members and chief financial officers can influence changes in PMSs. For
instance, Cobb et al. (1995) explicitly state that such individuals within banks are
generally considered as significant change agents. Cobb et al. (1995) also found top
management played a dual role in the bank’s change process; on the one hand top
management was the catalyst which initiated management accounting change
processes, and on the other hand their leadership ability was found to be necessary to
overcome barriers. Since PMSs are part of management accounting systems, top
management and the power of strong individuals are recognised as factors that affect
PMSs change as well.
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Corporate Culture
Corporate culture, which refers to the combined beliefs, values, ethics, procedures,
and atmosphere of an organisation (Pettigrew 1979), could influence the opinion of
employees about work practices, commitment, respect for managers and attitudes
towards providing service to the customer. The tradition of a particular industry and
leadership within an organisation could strongly affect the culture of an organisation
(Pettigrew 1979). For example, banks and bankers have a risk-averse nature, therefore
they choose systems and procedures which minimise overall organisational risk.
Hence, the manner in which a bank is managed is likely to be influenced by the
beliefs, attitudes and behaviour of the employees towards adopting and using a
particular procedure and system. If employees resist a particular change based on the
corporate culture prevailing in the bank, it may lead to conflicts, negotiations and/or
compromise.
The Basel Committee on banking supervision has also strongly emphasised
that a bank’s framework for managing operational risk must include the bank’s
appetite and tolerance for operational risk. The extent to which this is done is mainly
contingent on a bank’s corporate culture (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
2004, p167). Corporate culture, therefore, seems to have a tendency to influence
organisational systems in general and PMSs in particular.
5. STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO CHANGE EFFORTS
There is ample evidence in the literature that suggests organisations do not always
passively conform to changes, and that their responses to change vary. Drawing on
institutional theory and the resource dependence perspective10, Oliver (1991)
identified different strategic responses and tactics which organisations use in response
to the institutional pressures for conformity. More specifically, Oliver (1991)
proposed a typology of strategic responses to institutional pressures which shows that
strategic responses to institutional pressures vary with the degree of resistance exerted
by the organisation (See Table 1).
As shown in Table 1, at times, banks would passively respond (i.e.,
acquiescence strategy) to change efforts, and such response may take different forms
varying from unconscious habit-like adherence to rules or values to conscious
compliance to norms, values or institutional requirements (Oliver 1991, p152). Such
acquiescence is a strategic response that concurs with the idea of mimetic
isomorphism. For example, most small local/domestic banks are likely to imitate the
practices of major banks and foreign banks.
Alternatively, banks may take more active responses to institutional
pressures (i.e. compromise strategy). Where inconsistencies exist between
institutional expectations and objectives of the bank, banks are likely to apply
balancing tactics (i.e. attempt to achieve parity among or between multiple
10

The resource dependence perspective views an organisational environment as a bundle of resources
which an organisation seeks to mobilise to reach its goals. In doing so, it exercises active choice of
behaviour (Oliver 1991, p147).
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stakeholders and internal interest), or pacifying tactics (i.e. monitoring a minor level
of resistance to institutional pressure), or bargaining tactics (Oliver 1991, p153). Such
responses are likely to arise particularly in relation to banks operating internationally.
Bank branches located overseas might face a situation where the host banking
sector’s objectives are in dissonance with the organisational objective of the bank.
For example, risk management practices, central bank’s capital adequacy and
liquidity requirements, and prudential regulations vary from country to country.
In some situations, banks may use an “avoidance” strategy in order to
preclude the necessity of conformity (Oliver 1991, p154). To achieve this purpose
they may use a number of tactics. For instance, concealment tactics which involve
disguising non-conformity behind a façade of acquiescence, or buffering tactics
which involve attempts to reduce the extent to which it is externally inspected,
scrutinised or evaluated by partially detaching or decoupling its technical activities
from external contact (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978; Scott 1987). A more dramatic
avoidance response is ‘escape’, where a bank decides to exit the domain within which
pressure is exerted, or significantly alter its own goals, activities or domain to avoid
the necessity of conformity altogether (Oliver 1991). The literature provides evidence
of banks operating overseas who have exited (escaped) or buffered themselves from
the host banking sector due to an uncertain economic, financial and political
environment. For example, in the late 1990s the Bank of America, J.P. Morgan and
the Credit Agricole Indosuez banks pulled out of their operations in most of the East
Asian countries (Fuller 1999).
Table 1: A continuum of strategic responses to institutional pressures
Strategies
Low

Acquiescence

Compromise
Level of
active
resistance
to
institutional
pressures

Avoid

Defy

Manipulate

High

Tactics
Habit
Imitate
Comply
Balance
Pacify
Bargain
Conceal
Buffer
Escape
Dismiss
Challenge
Attack
Co-opt
Influence
Control

Examples
Following invisible, taken-for-granted norms
Mimicking institutional models
Obeying rules and accepting norms
Balancing the expectations of multiple constituents
Placating and accommodating institutional elements
Negotiating with institutional stakeholders
Disguising nonconformity
Loosening institutional attachments
Changing goals, activities, or domains
Ignoring explicit norms and values
Contesting rules and requirements
Assaulting the sources of institutional pressure
Importing influential constituents
Shaping values and criteria
Dominating institutional constituents and processes

Source: Oliver (1991, p 152)

Alternatively, a bank would ignore institutional rules and values, which
challenge the existing rules and requirements (i.e., “defiance” strategy). The most
aggressive defiance tactic is attacking the institutional pressures and expectations
(Oliver 1991, p156). Rather than partially refusing to follow the newly recommended
procedures (i.e. avoidance strategy), banks may decide to actively challenges such
procedures (i.e. defiance strategy). Further, a bank would even focus on changing the
content of the expectations themselves or the sources that seek to express or reinforce
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them (i.e. manipulation strategy). As a tactic, a bank may choose to co-opt the source
of the pressure or direct more general influence tactics towards institutionalised
values and beliefs, and the criteria of acceptable practices or performance. Banks also
could apply controlling tactics whereby they exert efforts to establish power and
dominance over those that are applying pressure on the banks (Oliver 1991, p157).
For example, large banks tend to create cartels to lobby regulatory authorities to adopt
certain practices that fit their needs.
Oliver’s (1991) typology provides an appropriate conceptual basis for
exploring the diversity of strategic responses that a bank may adopt in response to
institutional pressures to change their systems such as PMSs.
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper is to develop a framework to analyse changes in PMSs
within the banking sector, more specifically to examine the factors influencing
changes in PMSs and the organisational responses to change efforts. Existing research
provides only limited assistance to undertake such analysis particularly in relation to
the banking sector. Lack of such research compromises the explanation and
understanding of PMSs change in the banking sector. Such a research effort is even
more crucial in the wake of the recent global financial crisis which has caused rapid
changes in the banking environment.
The framework proposed in this paper and depicted in Figure 1 incorporates
the concept of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). In addition, the
continuum of strategic responses to institutional pressures proposed by Oliver (1991)
is used to increase the explanatory power of the framework, so that it allow a fuller
understanding of the complexities of PMSs change phenomena within banks. The
paper argues that the functioning of banks is subject to the influence of various
macro-level factors (i.e. economic, technological, socio-cultural and political), and
the resulting pressures which could take various forms (i.e. coercive, mimetic and
normative) subsequently lead to the introduction of changes to PMSs. While banks
may consider introducing certain changes to their PMSs because of the three forms of
pressure discussed above, the change efforts may also be subject to direct pressure
from certain powerful elements in the macro-level environment. Such influences may
be exerted using informal avenues, and the nature and the extent of the recommended
change could be the result of both formal (i.e. coercive, mimetic and normative
pressures) and informal pressures (direct influence of macro-level elements). The
paper argues that there is no universal way to manage the PMS change process, since
both the institutional as well as macro-level environment play a significant role in the
process of change in a PMS.
The paper also acknowledges that banks’ responses to change efforts could
vary between passive responses (i.e. acquiescence) to active responses (i.e.
manipulation). It is important to view PMS change as a complex process, with
unintended consequences and the potential to disrupt organisational life. Hence, those
responsible for introducing change in the PMS need to consider how employees react
to change in PMS.
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The paper contributes in two ways. First, the framework developed in this
paper could be used by managers and researchers to examine and understand changes
in PMSs in banks which could also facilitate them in adopting and implementing
performance measurement systems in an effective manner. Secondly, it makes a
theoretical contribution by developing a framework to enable a systematic analysis of
PMS change by drawing on two theoretical concepts, namely institutional
isomorphism and strategic responses to change. These unique features distinguish the
framework developed in this paper from previous approaches suggested within the
management accounting literature (e.g. Burns & Scapens 2000; Greenwood &
Hinings 1996; Hussain & Hoque 2002; Innes & Mitchell 1990; Kasurinen 2002;
Waggoner et al. 1999). Other researchers may consider how they can adapt the
framework to be applicable in other sectors.
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